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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

IN RE GOFF-KEOGH PLANS AND
IRAs AS PROPERTY OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE

In an age when Keogh plans
and individual retirement accounts (IRAs), which are qualified for favorable tax treatment
under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 1 are becoming substantial assets in millions of families, it
is not surprising that bankruptcy
trustees and debtors are often
battling over these funds in bankruptcy court. In fact, the volume
of litigation over a debtor's right
to keep an ERISA pension plan
despite the filing of a liquidation
petition appears to be increasing
at a rapid rate and is likely to continue to increase in the future as
these pension funds grow.
* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
** ProfessorofLaw, Hofstra University
School of Law, Hempstead, New York·
associated with the law firm of Moritt'
Wolfeld & ~esnick, Garden City, Ne~
York; associate member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
The writers are co-authors of Bankruptcy Law Manual, published by Warren
Gorham & Lamont.
'
1
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 898 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144, and in
scattered sections of the Internal Revenue
Code).

Although the bankruptcy estate
consists of all of the debtor's legal
or equitable interests in property
as of the commencement of the
case, 2 debtors have advanced
several arguments to support the
position that the debtor's interest
in Keogh plans and IRAs may not
be lost to the trustee. In re Goff, 3
a recent case decided by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, addressed and disposed of such arguments and concluded that a consequence of a
liquidation petition is that the unfortunate debtor may have to
begin saving for retirement all
over again.
The Goff case involved a joint
petition for liquidation filed by
debtor spouses who had self-employed retirement trusts (Keogh
plans 4 ) administered by City National Bank. The Keogh plans had
more than $90,000 deposited in
them, including a $2,878 contribu-

11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). For other
cases dealing with the fate of ERISA pension plans in bankruptcy, see, e.g., In re
Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 330 (D. Colo. 1983); In re
Wood, 23 Bankr. 552 (E.D. Tenn. 1982);
In re Rogers, 24 Bankr. 181 (Ariz. 1982).
4 These plans were established pursuant
to the Keogh-Smathers Act, Pub. L. No.
87-792, 76 Stat. 809 (1962).
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tion made by the debtors only
three days prior to the filing of the
liquidation petition. The Go tis
had the right under the Keogh
trust agreement to withdraw funds
prematurely (prior to retirement,
death, or sale or termination of
the business) subject only to a 10
percent tax penalty_.
The Debtors' Argument
The debtors took the position
that the Keogh plans were excluded from property of the estate
by virtue of Section 54l(c)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code, which provides: "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the
debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case
under this title."
This argument was based on an
antialienation clause contained in
the Keogh trust document which
provides:
Neither the assets nor the benefits
provided hereunder shall be subject
to alienation, anticipation, assignment, garnishment, attachment,
execution or levy of any kind, and
any attempt to cause such benefits
to be so subjected shall not be recognized, except to such extent as
may be required by law. 5

The bankruptcy trustee must
have been somewhat convinced
by the debtors' argument because

5

he presented an application to the
bankruptcy court to accept only
$2,000 in full settlement of the
claims of the estate against the
Keogh plans. 6 The creditors'
committee filed its opposition to
the trustee's application and the
bankruptcy court denied the application. The bankruptcy judge
held that the entire Keogh plans
were considered property of the
estate and that the exclusion
under Section 54l(c)(2) was not
applicable.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
began its analysis of the problem
by comparing the concepts of
property of the estate under the
former Bankruptcy Act and under
the Bankruptcy Code. Under Section 70(a)(5) of the former Act,
assets became part of the estate
only if a two-part test was met: (1)
the property had to be either
transferable or leviable in nature,
and (2) the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act had to be served by
inclusion of the property. On the
second part of the test, the Supreme Court in Segal v. Rochelle 7
indicated that where property "is
sufficiently rooted in pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled
with the bankrupt's ability to
make an unencumbered fresh
start . . . it should be regarded as
'property' [of the estate]. " 8 On
the other hand, the Bankruptcy

bId. at 577 n.7.
7 382 u.s. 375 (1966).
s Jd. at 380.

Goff, 706 F.2d at 577.
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Code's concept of "property of
the estate" under Section 541(a)
is much broader in scope, including "all legal or equitable interests'' that the debtor had as of the
date of bankruptcy. The old twopart test based on transferability or
leviability, as well as on policy
considerations, has no role under
the Code. As noted by the court of
appeals in a footnote: "Whi~e the
existence of a 'legal or eqmtable
interest' may turn upon state nonbankruptcy law, once it is determined that such an interest exists,
it automatically becomes property
of the estate under § 541 of the
Code. " 9
There is no doubt that the debtors had a "legal or equitable
interest" in the Keogh plans when
the joint petition was filed. However, the debtors argued that Section 54l(c)(2), set forth above, effectively excludes the plans from
the estate. They contended that
the antialienation clause in the
trust agreements, which is required in ERISA pension plans to
qualify for favored tax treatment, 10 is a restriction on the
transfer of the debtors' beneficial
interest in the trust which is protected by Section 541(c)(2).

Goff 706 F.2d at 578 n.lO.
U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) requires, in
relevant part, that in order to be t~x-quali
fied, a pension trust must prov1de that
"benefits provided under the plan may not
be assigned or alienated." See also 29
u.s.c. § !056(d)(l).
9

to 26
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Court of Appeals Disagrees
With Debtor
The court of appeals rejected
the debtors' reliance on Section
541(c)(2) and affirmed the bankruptcy court's holding that the
Keogh plans in question rem~in
property of the estate. SectiOn
541(c)(2) makes effective only
those restrictions that are "enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." However' the
court carefully examined legislative history and held that Congress did not intend to includ~ all
ERISA plans in the exemptiOn.
"Rather, we find that Congress intended to exclude only trust funds
in the nature of 'spend thrift trusts'
from the property of the estate.
. . . [I]t is clear in the immediate
case that appellate's self-settled
trust did not constitute a spendthrift trust entitled to exclusion
under relevant state law.'' 11 The
court concluded that the Keogh
plans that were set up and controlled by the debtors would not
be
considered
''spendthrift
trusts" under Texas law which is
applicable nonbankruptcy law ~n
this case. "The general rule 1s
well established that if a settlor
creates a trust for his own benefit
and inserts a 'spendthrift' clause,
restraining alienation or assignment, it is void as far as creditors
are concerned and they can reach
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Goff, 706 F.2d at 580.
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the settlor's interest in the
trust." 12
It is important to note that the
court of appeals limited its holding
only to self-settled Keogh plans
and IRAs and did not extend. it to
other ERISA-qualified pension
plans which would be treated as
spendthrift trusts under applicable state law. In fact, the court recognized that employer-created
pension trusts receiving ERISA
tax treatment may be excluded
from the estate under Section
541(c)(2).

trusts which violates ERISA's
statutory intention to treat all retirement plans the same way. In
addition, since a debtor may quit
employment immediately following the bankruptcy case, thus
terminating the pension trust and
receiving the funds, "any bankruptcy distinction made on the
basis of the revokable, self-settled
nature of self-employed pension
plans is arbitrary . 14 The court rejected these arguments, noting that
if such a distinction in bankruptcy conflicts with the policy of
ERISA, "bankruptcy law preIn analyzing the effectiveness in
vails." 15 The court also disagreed
bankruptcy of spendthrift proviwith the debtors' characterization
sions in pension plans, the courts
have generally concluded that that the degree of beneficiary conthose contained in employer- trol is the same for Keogh plans
created plans were effective [while] and employer-created plans. !;"or
similar provisions in self-settled Keogh beneficiaries, premature
plans were not. The latter conclu- withdrawal results in a 10 percent
sion is inescapable since, as dis- tax penalty, whereas the emcussed earlier, the traditional law ployee must quit his or her job in
of spendthrift trusts has rejected order to obtain funds in the emthe notion of effective spendthrift ployer-created trust. "We cannot
provisions in self-settled trusts. As
equate a 'tax penalty' with 'emto the former, without passing upon
ployment termination' as equal
the exact limits of plans which
restraints
upon withdrawal of
could properly be characterized
16
pension
funds."
"spendthrift trusts," the emMoreover,
the
court did not
ployer-created-and-controlled narule
out
the
possibility
that, in an
ture of those plans may well make
them analogous to a spendthrift appropriate case, even a selftrust. 13
settled trust may be excluded
from
the estate under Section
The debtors in Goff argued that
if certain restrictions
541(c)(2)
the above analysis results in diswere
placed
on the debtor's conparate treatment of self-employed
and employer-created pension
~

12

13

/d. at 587.
/d. at 589.

14

/d. at 588.

IS

fd. at 589.
/d.

16
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troland on premature withdrawal.
In a footnote, the court stated:
We leave open the question of
whether an appropriate case might
be presented in which the restrictions upon a settlor-beneficiary's
control and withdrawal of funds in
a self-settled trust would ever render effective a spendthrift clause
under applicable state law. Consider, for example, a restriction
that would condition premature
withdrawal upon a self-employed
individual's sale of his business or
career change. 17

The "Federal Law" Exemption
Another argument commonly
advanced for exempting ERISA
pension plans from the reach of
the trustee is based on Section
522(b )(2)(A) which provides that
a debtor who selects the state
exemption system under Section
522(b) may also exempt property
pursuant to "federal law" other
than Section 522(d). Although the
Goffs did not claim an exemption
for the Keogh plans under this
other "federal law" exemption,
which made Section 522(b)(2)(A)
inapplicable in that case, the court
of appeals nonetheless discussed
the relevance of that section on
self-settled pension plans.
The court examined the legislative history and found that Congress provided a nonexclusive list
of illustrations of federal laws that
create exemptions applicable un17

ld. at 589 n.42.

[VOL. 16 : 264 1984]

der Section 522(b)(2)(A). 18 The
list included such items as foreign
service retirement and disability
payments (22 U.S.C. § 1104), Social Security payments (42 U.S.C.
§ 407), civil service retirement
benefits (5 U.S.C. § 729, 2265),
etc. The court noted the conspicuous absence of ERISA from
the illustrative list. The court also
pointed out that ERISA does not
require that all pension plan funds
be exempt from a creditor's
reach, but only requires that the
plan contain an antialienation
clause in order to qualify forcertain tax advantages. "By contrast, the listed statutes which establish or guarantee certain benefits directly preclude all such benefits from alienation or assignment." 19 Referring to the illustrative list in the legislative history,
the court indicated that ERISA
was not merely overlooked by accident:
Given the extensive and general
reach of ERISA-qualified plans, it
is highly improbable that Congress
intended their inclusion without
mention in the Section 522(b)
(2)(A) exemption in the midst of a
listing of significantly less comprehensive and less well known
statutes. The often-stated admonition that it may be treacherous to
attach great weight to congressional silence in interpreting its
laws does not apply in this case in
18 S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
75 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 360 (1977).
19 Goff, 706 F.2d at 585.
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light of the comprehensive consideration of this issue which is revealed by this history. 20

Lessons to Be Learned

The court's conclusion that
self-settled Keogh plans are
neither excluded from the estate
under Section 54I(c)(2) nor
exempt from federal law within
the meaning of Section 522(b)
(2}(A) means that the debtor will
lose such funds to the trustee in
the liquidation case unless the
plan is exempt • under a state
exemption statute and the debtor
elects the state exemption system.
If the debtor elects the Section
522(d) federal exemption system
in a state that did not "opt out"
Jd.; cf. In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233
(Kan. 1982), which held that ERISA pension trusts are exempt under § 522
(b)(2)(A), and which found that ERISA
was substantially similar to the types of
statutes included on the illustrative list.
2o

of
that
system, 21
Section
522(d)(lO)(E) gives the debtor an
exemption in the Keogh plan only
"to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor
and any dependent of the
debtor." The factors considered
by the court in determining the
extent to which the plan is necessary for support include age,
health, future earnings, and necessary expenditures. 22 It is unlikely, therefore, that a debtor
who is not near retirement age and
who is likely to have significant
future earnings from which to
save for retirement will be permitted an exemption for most
funds in a Keogh or IRA trust.
21 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), which permits
a state to enact legislation to prohibit its
citizens from selecting the federal exemption system contained in § 522(d).
22
See In re Kochell, 26 Bankr. 86
(W.D. Wis. 1982); In re Donaghy, 11
Bankr. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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